Citat:
Nedeljko: Pozivaš se na nešto što ne razumeš.
Citat:
Nedeljko: Naprotiv. Da si se obrazovao, znao bi da tu nema nikakvog paradoksa.
Pustimo sad mene, sta ja razumem, a sta ne. Nastavi da obrazlazes kako Curryev paradoks ne postoji, i kako se svi ovi ljudi zamlacuju sa glupostima. Ovo je prava slika trenutnog stanja na forumu nauke. A tako je vec godinama. Niko nista ne moze da progovori od bezgranicno sujetnih clanova forumskog lobija, i sve poruke se brisu. Osim naravno ako se ne slazete sa njima. Mislim da to nije korisno za ovaj forum.
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Other Internet Resources
* Restall, G., 1994, On Logics Without Contraction, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Queensland)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/